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Skrivseth: Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairness and Certainty in Sentencing

ABOLISHING PAROLE:
ASSURING FAIRNESS AND CERTAINTY
IN SENTENCING
Karen Skrivseth*
Congress has recently undertaken a major revision of sentencing practices in the federal criminal justice system. 1 The primary
impetus for reform is dissatisfaction with the existing indeterminate
* Legislative Counsel, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice,
United States Department of Justice. B.A., 1963, Pennsylvania State University; J.D.,
1968, American University.
The views stated in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the United States Department of Justice.
1. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). This Article deals with §§ 101 and 124
of the bill. Id. § 101, 124. Section 101 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 18 of
the United States Code regarding, inter alia, sentencing guidelines. All subsequent
textual and footnote references to § 101 of the bill are to the proposed section numbers in Title 18 of the United States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 18
U.S.C. Section 124 of the bill, if enacted, will amend Title 28 of the United States
Code to establish a Sentencing Commission. All subsequent textual and footnote references to § 124 of the bill are to proposed section numbers in Title 28 of the United
States Code, and are hereinafter cited as Proposed 28 U.S.C.
This Article focuses on S. 1437 in the form that it passed the United States Senate by a vote of 72 to 15 on January 30, 1978. 124 CONG. REC. S860 (daily ed. Jan.
30, 1978). The bill was introduced in somewhat different form on May 2, 1977, by
Senators McClellan and Kennedy, 123 CONG. REc. S6833 (daily ed. May 2, 1977).
H.R. 6869, identical to the original version of S. 1437, was introduced by Congressman Rodino on May 3, 1977. 123 CONG. REC. H3959 (daily ed. May 3, 1977).
The major difference between the sentencing provisions in H.R. 6869 and those
in S. 1437 is the Senate bill's marked transformation of the current indeterminate
system into a determinate scheme. S. 1437 limits the use of indeterminate sentences
to the unusual case in which the judge finds, consistent with sentencing guidelines,
that only a prison setting can provide a needed rehabilitation program. Proposed 28
U.S.C., supra, §§ 994(b)(2), 994(j). See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 883,
1166 (1977). H.R. 6869 neither requires determinate sentencing nor restricts its application to a particular type of case. The bill's only specific limitation is that the
maximum term of parole ineligibility that can be imposed is 90% of the term of imprisonment. H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1977) (to have been codified, if
enacted, in 18 U.S.C. § 2301(c)).
The Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary
reported H.R. 13959, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H8970 (daily ed. Aug.
17, 1978). This bill proposes only minor changes in sentencing law which would not
affect the amount of indeterminacy in sentencing or the role of the United States
Parole Commission in determining prisoner release dates. This bill was not reported
out of the full committee.
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sentencing scheme 2 and its historical basis, 3 the rehabilitation model. 4 Under the present system, prison sentences are imposed in
two stages. Initially, the judge determines the kind of sentence to
impose; 5 if imprisonment is selected, the judge must determine
the maximum period the offender will spend in prison.6 The
United States Parole Commission subsequently decides what
portion of this term the offender actually serves. 7 The original rationale for this indeterminate sentencing process was that it enabled the length of a prison sentence to be tailored to an offender's
progress toward rehabilitation. 8 The rehabilitative model, however,
has been discredited, 9 and in practice is no longer the sole or
even primary basis for determining types or lengths of sentences. 10

2. For purposes of this Article, an "indeterminate" sentence means a sentence
to imprisonment which sets the maximum term a defendant will serve; the actual release date is determined after the sentence is imposed. A sentence is described as
indeterminate even if the defendant is ineligible for release during a portion of the
imprisonment term. A "determinate" sentence means a sentence of imprisonment
that specifies the term a defendant will actually serve.
3. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819; 45 CONG. REC. 6374
(1910) (remarks of Rep. Clayton); AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 34-40, 84 (1971).
4. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 86-102 (1973); N. MORRIS, THE
FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 15-18 (1974); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 9-18 (1976);

J.Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 59, 191-93 (1975); Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment,PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1976, at 104; Von Hirsch, The Aims of Imprisonment, CURRENT HIST., July/Aug. 1976, at 1.
5. Most statutes that create a federal offense specify a maximum term of imprisonment and a maximum fine. The sentencing judge may impose any term of imprisonment or fine up to the legislative maximums, or a combination of the two sentences. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§471, 875, 1341 (1976). For most offenses, the judge
may suspend imposition or execution of the sentence and place the convicted de-

fendant on probation, or impose a split sentence of up to six months in prison followed by probation. See, e.g., id. § 3651.
6. The statute that creates the offense specifies the maximum term of imprisonment. See note 5 supra. There is no general statute governing the imposition of
prison terms. In a few cases, the statute dictates the actual term or a minimum term
of imprisonment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2114 (1976). However, unless explicitly provided otherwise, a defendant convicted of an offense for which there is a
"mandatory" term of imprisonment may be placed on probation, and, if sentenced to
prison, paroled. Compare, for example, the sentencing provision applicable to a first
offender under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with that applicable to a second offender. See also
S. 2698, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7, 121 CONG. REC. 37,561 (1975).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4203(b), 4206(a) (1976). The United States Parole Commission
has jurisdiction over any prisoner whose term exceeds one year. Id. § 4205(a).
8. See sources cited note 3 supra.
9. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 27, 54, 69 (1977). See also sources cited note 4 supra.

10. The primary purposes for parole-release decisions are now to reduce un-
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The Parole Commission itself has recognized that the theoretical
individualization of sentences produced by deferring the parole decision has resulted in disparate sentences for similar defendants"
and uncertainty about an offender's actual release date. 12 Although
13
the Commission has attempted to ameliorate these problems, it
cannot eliminate the disparity and uncertainty caused by the absence of adequate legislative guidance for sentencing judges. 14
To remedy the problems of disparity and uncertainty inherent
in the indeterminate model of sentencing, S. 143 7 -the proposed
comprehensive revision of the Federal Criminal Code' 5 passed by
the United States Senate in the 95th Congress' 6-- establishes a
Sentencing Commission empowered to issue guidelines to structure the exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge. 17This bill
makes most judicially imposed sentences determinate, subject to
reduction only for satisfactory compliance with institutional regulations.' 8 S. 1437 further limits the Parole Commission's responsibili
ties to setting release dates' 9 for a very small percentage of federal
warranted sentencing disparity and to provide increased certainty in sentencing.

See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,808 (1977); Statement of Cecil C. McCall, Chairman, United
States Parole Commission, presented to the Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the
House judiciary Committee, at 5, 29-30 (Apr. 18, 1978) (on file in office of the
Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Cecil C. McCall].
11. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973).
12. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,808 (1977).
13. In 1972 the Parole Commission began experimenting with parole guidelines to reduce unwarranted disparity in judicially imposed terms of imprisonment.
P. Hoffman & D. Gottfredson, Paroling Policy Guidelines: A Matter of Equity
(NCCD Parole Decision-Making Project, Supp. Rep No. 9, 1973). Guidelines have
been in use for all eligible federal prisoners since 973, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973);
their use was legislatively endorsed in 1976 by amendment of §§ 4203(a)(1) and
4206(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code. Parole Commission and Reorganization
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976). To increase sentence certainty, in
1977 the Parole Commission began to issue "presumptive release dates" to most
prisoners shortly after they commenced serving their sentences. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,808
(1977).
14. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1437 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8899, 8902 (1977) (statement of Pierce O'Donnell) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Senate Hearings].
15. 18 U.S.C. (1976).
16. 124 CoNG. REC. S860 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1978). See note 1 supra.
17. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 2003(a)(1)(D), (a)(2); Proposed 28
U.S.C., supra note 1, §§ 991, 994(a)(1).
18. See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, §§ 2003(a)(1)(D), (a)(2), 3824(a)(1),
(b); Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 994(b), 6); S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 883 (1977).
19. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3831(a).
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prisoners, and determining the terms and conditions of postrelease

supervision for all prisoners whose terms of imprisonment exceed

20
one year.
The parole provisions of S. 1437 indicate the Senate's
awareness that most aspects of the present parole system should
not be included in a determinate sentencing system. Unfortunately, S. 1437 does not go far enough: Effective determinate
sentencing reform can best be accomplished by completely
eliminating the existing parole structure. This Article argues that
the United States Parole Commission should be abolished; all necessary parole functions can be incorporated into a fully determinate
sentencing system without undue structural or financial disruption
of the federal criminal justice system. 2 1
UNWARRANTED DISPARITY AND UNCERTAINTY IN SENTENCING

In General
Unwarranted disparity in sentences imposed results when
judges impose different sentences which cannot be justified by dissimilarities among offenses or histories or characteristics of defendants. 2 2 Unwarranted disparity in sentences actually served occurs
when mechanisms in the federal criminal justice system for correcting disparity in sentences imposed are not successful. 2 3 Uncer20. Id. § 3841.
21. A number of recent publications suggest that parole in its present form
should be abolished in the context of a determinate sentencing system. See, e.g., A.
NEIER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: A RADICAL SOLUTION 197-98 (1976); P.
O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 9, at 68-71; Joint Committee of
the Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, The Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AmER. CrM. L. REV. 377, 389-97 (1977); McLaughlin, The Case of the Criminologist Who Changed His Mind, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 26, 1978 (Today Magazine),
at 16, 40; A. von Hirsch & K. Hanrahan, Abolish Parole? 36-37 (Sept. 1978) (summary
of report submitted to National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
suggesting parole in its present form should be abolished, but Parole Commission
should be retained to determine lengths of prison terms under sentencing guidelines
promulgated by Sentencing Commission).
22. Sentences vary according to the judge who imposes sentence. See, e.g., M.
FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 21; A. Partridge & W. Eldridge, Second Circuit Sentencing
Study, A Report to the Judges of the Second Circuit, reprinted in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1 and S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
8101, 8104-14 (1974). Sentences imposed in different districts for similar offenses
may also vary. See generally L.P. SUTTON, FEDERAL SENTENCING PATTERNS
(1978).
23. For example, there are wide variations in time served in prison by male
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tainty regarding the length of time a prisoner will serve in prison
24
occurs when the date of release is subject to constant adjustment.
Disparity in Judicially Imposed Sentences
Under current federal law unwarranted disparity in sentences
imposed is unavoidable. In many cases, there are several substantive criminal statutes under which a defendant may be prosecuted.
These statutes usually provide different maximum sentences for
similar offenses. 25 Congress has further enacted several sentencing
statutes that judges may use in selecting an appropriate sentence
within the statutory maximum. 2 6 Neither substantive criminal law
nor sentencing statutes provide guidance to structure a judge's

sentencing decision.
Generally, the sentencing judge has unfettered discretion to
choose among a number of sentencing options. The judge may either impose a term of imprisonment, up to the maximum length
specified for the particular offense, or a sentence to pay a fine, up
to the maximum amount specified for the particular offense, or a
bank robbers of similar age, marital status, education, and prior criminal record. 1977
Senate Hearings,supra note 14, at 9200, 9228 app. (attachment D) (paper prepared
by Karen Skrivseth, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
24. The official report on the Attica riots indicates that the uncertainty of release dates was a major cause of the disturbance. NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION o. ATTICA, ATTICA (1972), cited in A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 158

n.11. Prisoners generally favor certainty regarding their release dates early in the
sentencing process rather than the uncertainties of past Parole Commission practices.
See Emmrich, Pen Inmates Air Gripes, Atlanta Const., Dec. 5, 1978, at 1-C, col. 5.
25. For example, there are approximately 130 theft offenses under current law,
with maximum sentences ranging from no imprisonment and a $500 fine, 18 U.S.C. §
288 (1976), to 10 years of imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, id. § 641. The theft statutes in current law are set forth in SUBCOMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE

1437 UPON PRESENT
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PT. 1I, at 1153-1223 (Comm. Print 1978). While the theft
statutes occasionally vary the penalty according to the amount that is stolen, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 288 (1976), there is little difference among offenses that would justify differences in sentences. Embezzlement is an excellent illustration. The maximum penalty
for embezzling manpower funds is a $10,000 fine and two years of imprisonment if
the amount embezzled is more than $100; if the amount embezzled is not more than
$100 the maximum penalty is a $1,000 fine and one year of imprisonment. Id. §
665(a). If a bankruptcy trustee embezzles any amount of money from a bankrupt estate, the maximum penalty is a $5,000 fine and five years of imprisonment. Id. § 153.
If a person entrusted with public funds embezzles them, the maximum penalty, if
the amount embezzled is more than $100, is a fine of the amount embezzled and 10
years of imprisonment; if the amount embezzled is $100 or less, the maximum penalty is a $1,000 fine and one year of imprisonment. Id. § 648.
26. See notes 27-51 infra and accompanying text.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., IMPACT OF S.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

5

HOFSTRA
LAW
REVIEW
Hofstra
Law
Review,
Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1979],(Vol.
Art. 37: 281

combination of the two.2 7 For most offenses, the judge has the additional options of placing the convicted offender on probation 28 or
sentencing him or her to a "split sentence," consisting of a brief
29
period in prison followed by probation.
In addition, the sentencing judge determines the period of
time a prisoner must be incarcerated before he or she is eligible
for parole. 30 The judge may prescribe that a prisoner whose term
of imprisonment exceeds one year is eligible for parole immediately,31 or after serving up to one-third of the sentence. 32 If the
sentencing judge does not specify when the prisoner is eligible for
parole, he or she is eligible by operation of law after one-third of
33
the term is served.
Opportunities for exercising unstructured judicial discretion
are compounded by the number of alternative sentencing statutes
under which a judge may sentence offenders possessing particular
characteristics. A defendant between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six may be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act. 34 Although typically under this Act an indeterminate six-year
sentence is imposed which requires release of the offender on
27. Most statutes that create federal offenses specify the maximum prison term
and maximum fine that may be imposed, and whether a fine, a term of imprisonment, or a combination of the two may be imposed. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 874,
2113(a) (1976). A few statutes provide only for a fine, see, e.g., id. § 288, or only for
imprisonment, see, e.g., id. § 2112.
28. The judge may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence of a
person convicted of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment and
place the person on probation. Id. § 3651.
29. Id. Under this section, the judge may split the sentence between a prison
term of up to six months and a period of probation for any offense not punishable by
death or life imprisonment if the maximum term of imprisonment is more than six
months.
30. A person sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or less is not eligible for parole. See id. § 4205(a)-(b). Instead, the offender either serves his or her
full term less good-time credit earned, id. § 4163, or, if the sentence is between six
months and one year, the prisoner may be released "as if on parole" after serving
one-third of the sentence. Id. § 4205(f). A person is released "as if on parole" by operation of law rather than by Parole Commission designation. The offender is subject
to parole supervision as if the Commission had placed him or her on parole.
31. Id. § 4205(b)(2).
32. Id. § 4205(b)(1).
33. Id. § 4205(a).
34. Id. §§ 5005-5026. The Federal Youth Corrections Act applies, by its terms,
to offenders under the age of 22 at the time of conviction, id. § 5006(d); however, the
Act's sentencing provisions may be applied to defendants between the ages of 22
and 26 at the time of conviction. Id. § 4216. The juvenile delinquency statutes apply
to persons who commit offenses before they are 18 years old if the oflbnses
committed would be crimes if committed by adults. Id. § 5031.
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parole after serving no more than four years,3 5 the judge may sentence the offender to probation, 36 or to a term of imprisonment not
exceeding the term that could have been imposed had the offender
been sentenced as an adult.3 7 An offender sentenced under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act is eligible for parole immediately, 3 8
and generally is paroled at an earlier date than if he or she were
sentenced as an adult. 39
A defendant who is an addict and is convicted of certain
nonviolent offenses may be sentenced to undergo treatment under
Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966.40 This
sentence may be an indeterminate one that does not exceed either
the sentence that would be applicable had the offender been a
41
nonaddict adult, or a ten-year prison term, whichever is shorter.
Such an offender is eligible for parole after "he has been treated
for six months" 4 2 and generally serves a shorter term of imprison43
ment than his or her regular adult counterpart.
There is one sentencing statute that is applied pursuant to the
decision of the prosecutor rather than the sentencing judge.4 4 If
the offender has a substantial felony record, 4 5 makes a living by
committing felonies, 46 or engages in racketeering activity, 47 the
prosecutor may seek "dangerous special offender"4 8 sentencing. If
the judge finds that the offender belongs to one of these groups
and is "dangerous," 49 he or she may impose "an appropriate term
not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity
to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law." 50 A similar
35. Id. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c).
36. Id. § 5010(a).
37. Id. § 5010(c).
38. Id. § 5017(a). See 28 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1978).
39. The guidelines issued by the United States Parole Commission for adult offenders are separate from those issued for persons sentenced under either the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976), or title II of the Narcotic
Addict Rehabilitation Act. Id. §§ 4251-4256. The adult guidelines recommend longer
prison terms than the youth and addict guidelines for all offenses of moderate or
greater severity. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978).
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4256 (1976).
41. Id. §§ 4251, 4253(a).
42. Id. § 4254.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1976).
45. Id. § 3575(e)(1).
46. Id. § 3575(e)(2).
47. Id. § 3575(e)(3).
48. Id. § 3575(a).
49. Id. § 3575(a)-(b), (e)-(1).
50. Id. § 3575(b).
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sentencing statute applies to persons who traffic in controlled substances. 51
The inevitable consequence of the unbridled judicial discretion

that results from both the varied maximum sentences applicable to
similar offenses and the numerous sentencing alternatives available
for each offense is that similarly situated defendants receive differ-

ent types or lengths of sentences 52 or are eligible for parole after
different periods of time. 53 The appearance of unwarranted disparity is compounded by the absence of a requirement that judges
state reasons for their sentences: 54 Even if seemingly unwarranted
disparities in sentences are justified by differences among offenses
and offenders, this cannot be ascertained from the records in criminal cases.
51. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 409, 21
U.S.C. § 849 (1976).
52. Of the 36,505 persons convicted of federal offenses in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1978, 17,426, or 47.7%, were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1978 Annual Report of the
Director for the Twelve-Month Period Ending June 30, 1978, Table D-7 (corrected
table available from Administrative Office of the United States Courts). Even among
similar offenses, there is substantial disparity concerning whether incarceration is
imposed. For example, in the same period 1,979, or 42.1%, of the 4,698 persons convicted of "larceny" or "theft" were sentenced to terms of imprisonment, whereas
466, or 25.5%, of the 1,822 persons convicted of "embezzlement" were sent to

prison. Id., Table D-5 (corrected table available from Administrative office of the
United States Courts). This apparent disparity appears even when only felony convictions for larceny or theft are compared with felony convictions for embezzlement:
Of the 3,547 defendants sentenced for a larceny or theft felony, 1,863, or 52.4%, were
sentenced to prison, whereas 437, or 31.2%, of the 1,399 defendants sentenced for an
embezzlement felony were sentenced to prison. The average term of imprisonment
for the felony offenders was 24.5 months for persons convicted of larceny or theft
and 13.5 months for persons convicted of embezzlement. Id. See also notes 22 & 23
supra.
53. Although 1,132, or 6,3%, of the 17,426 defendants sentenced to prison during the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1978, were eligible for early release on
parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(1) or (b)(2), there was substantial variation
among districts regarding the percentage of prisoners sentenced under these provisions. For example, none of the district judges in the First Circuit imposed a sentence under § 4205(b)(1) or (b)(2) in any of the 412 cases in which a prison term was
imposed in the twelve-month period, whereas half the defendants sentenced to
prison (105 out of 212) by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
received sentences pursuant to bne of these provisions. Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, 1978 Annual Report of the Director for the Twelve-Month Period Ending June 30, 1978, Table D-7 (corrected table available from Administrative
Office of United States Courts).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2618 n.1 (1978) (Stewart,
J., dissenting). See also Proposed Rules on Sentencing of the Judicial Council of tile
Second Circuit § III(c)(3) (Mar. 17, 1976), quoted in United States v. Ramos, 572
F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1978).
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Disparity in Prison Terms Actually Served
Originally, the role of the United States Parole Commission
was to determine whether a person sentenced to a term of imprisonment could be released from prison before the expiration of the

term without undue risk that the offender would commit further
criminal offenses. 55 As it became increasingly apparent that knowledge of human behavior is inadequate to predict when a prisoner
has been rehabilitated, 5 6 the Parole Commission changed its focus
from determining when rehabilitation has occurred to alleviating

disparity in prison sentences and increasing certainty about release
dates.
In 1973 the United States Parole Commission promulgated
guidelines applicable to all federal prisoners eligible for parole 57 to
mitigate unwarranted disparity in sentences to terms of imprisonment. 58 These guidelines recommend a range of months that each
prisoner should spend in prison. This range is calculated by rating
the offender according to his or her criminal history, drug dependence, and employment history, 5 9 and by categorizing the offense
according to its relative severity.6 0 In deciding whether to release a
55. See 45 CONG. REC.6374 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Clayton).
56. See sources cited notes 3 & 4 supra.
57. The original parole guidelines appear at 38 Fed. Reg. 31,942 (1973). The
current guidelines appear at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). They are reproduced in
Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 104-06 (1978). The
United States Parole Commission is considering a substantial revision of the
guidelines. 43 Fed. Reg. 46,859-67 (1978). The use of parole guidelines was legislatively endorsed by the enactment of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 219 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4203(a) 1),
4206(a) (1976)).
58. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1978).
59. The list of offender characteristics, or "salient factor score," appears at 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). It is reproduced in Hoffman & Stover, supra note 57, at 107.
The "salient factors" were selected after extensive empirical research concerning the
history and characteristics of defendants released from prison and the relationship of
those characteristics to the relative ability of parolees to avoid both violations of
parole conditions that result in imprisonment and subsequent arrests or convictions.
For a more detailed description of the items in the salient factor score, see U.S.
Parole Comm'n Research Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Salient Factor Scoring Manual
Revised (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 14, 1977). For discussions of
the development and revalidation of the salient factor score, see P. Hoffman & J.
Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 2, 1974); P. Hoffman & J. Beck, Research Notes: Salient Factor
Score Validation-A 1972 Release Cohort (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep.
No. 8, 1975); P. Hoffman, B. Stone-Meierhoefer & J. Beck, Salient Factor Score and
Release Behavior: Three Validation Samples (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit
Rep. No. 15, 1977).
60. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978).
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prisoner on parole, the Commission must consider the applicable
guidelines range. 6 ' A release date outside the guidelines range

62
must be justified by a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance.

Approximately eighty to eighty-five percent of parole-release deci63
sions are within the guideline ranges.

Although parole guidelines have substantially reduced
unwarranted disparity in lengths of prison terms, it is impossible
for the Parole Commission alone to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentences. For example, the Commission cannot affect disparity in sentencing that occurs when one of two similarly situated

defendants is sentenced to a term of imprisonment while the other
is placed on probation; nevertheless, this may be the greatest area
of disparity." The Commission cannot eliminate a prison sentence
that should not have been imposed; it can only ameliorate this

problem by releasing the prisoner on the date of parole eligibility.
Conversely, the Commission cannot imprison a convicted person
who should have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment but
was not. Furthermore, the Parole Commission has no authority to
lengthen the sentence of a person imprisoned for too short a pe-

riod, or to shorten the term of imprisonment for a person who is
not eligible for parole for an unreasonably long time.
Moreover, application of the guidelines can produce unwarranted disparity. The guidelines are not sufficiently detailed to re61. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(b) (1978).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976); 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(c)-(d) (1978). An aggravating or
mitigating circumstance may also be used to vary the severity rating for a decision
within the guidelines. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(d) (1978).
63. During the first half of fiscal year 1978, 82.5% of the prisoners released
were incarcerated for the time recommended in the guidelines. S. Adelberg,
Workload and Decision Trends: Statistical Highlights, Interim Report for the Period
Oct. 1976 to Mar. 1978, at 15 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Draft, July 12,
1978). The percentage of parole decisions within the guidelines since October 1974
has ranged from 79.9% for the period from October 1976 through September 1977 to
84.4% for the period from October 1974 through September 1975, B. StoneMeierhoefer, Workload and Decision Trends: Statistical Highlights 10/74-9/77, at
R-10 (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 18, 1977). The Parole Commission statistics show a release date outside the parole guidelines only if the deviation
results from Commission discretion. A release date is considered to be within the
guidelines if it falls outside the recommended range by operation of law, See P.
Hoffman, Federal Parole Guidelines: Three Years of Experience, at J-5 (U.S. Board
of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 10, 1975).
64. A recently completed study of the feasibility of sentencing guidelines notes
that what the authors call the "in-out" decision is a frequently overlooked aspect of
unwarranted sentencing variation. L. WILMNS, J. KRESS, D. GOTrFREDSON, J.
CALPIN & A. GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 2-3 (1978).
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flect important differences between offender and offense characteristics. Perhaps the most serious problem is that the guidelines
65
frequently group dissimilar offenses in a single severity category.
Offense categorization rarely accounts for differences in the harm
inflicted on victims. 6 6 Furthermore, the guidelines do not differentiate between an offender who has played a minor role in an offense and one who has planned and directed the commission of an
offense by several other people. 67 It is virtually impossible to de-

termine how the guidelines would differentiate between a defendant convicted of numerous counts and one convicted of a single
count. 68

The list of offender characteristics in the parole guidelines 69
may also contribute to disparity. The rating for criminal history, for
example, is determined by simply counting all prior felonies and
most misdemeanors, without evaluating the relative seriousness of
the prior offenses and with little regard for the length of time the
of the offense for
prisoner obeyed the law prior to commission
70
which he or she is presently incarcerated.
65. For example, offering or accepting a bribe of a public official is treated in
the current guidelines as an offense of moderate severity, with a guidelines recommendation that a prisoner spend from 12 to 32 months in prison, depending on the
offender's characteristics. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The guidelines make no distinction regarding offense severity based on the quid pro quo for the bribe, the nature of
the trust violated, the amount of the bribe, or the extensiveness of the bribery
scheme. The proposed amendments to the guidelines set forth at 43 Fed. Reg.
46,863-67 (1978) would rank bribery according to the amount of the bribe or the
monetary value of the favor demanded in return for the bribe; however, the amendments do not provide for other variations in offense characteristics. See id. at 46,867
n.11.
66. Property offenses are ranked according to the amount taken; robbery offenses are ranked according to whether a weapon was fired or a person injured. 28
C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). However, property offense severity ratings do not distinguish
between thefts where the defendant could not have known how much he or she
would receive, and thefts where the defendant knew how much he or she was taking, such as embezzlement. The severity ratings also do not distinguish between
similar amounts taken from victims who are able to withstand the loss and those who
are not.
67. The parole guidelines rate the severity of conspiracy at the same level as
the underlying offense if the offense is consummated, and at one level lower than
the underlying offense if it is not consummated. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 n.7 (1978) (adult
guidelines). Thus, for example, the planner of a major bank robbery that is not consummated could be treated less severely than the person who holds up the bank
alone, receives a small amount of money, and uses no weapon.
68. The notes to the guidelines state only that, "[i]f an offense behavior involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level may be increased." Id. at n.4.
69. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
70. U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guideline Appli-
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Release-Date Uncertainty

The Parole Commission has recently become concerned with
the problem of uncertainty about the length of time a prisoner will

actually spend in prison. The problem arises because a convicted
defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding
one year is eligible for release on parole for at least two-thirds of
the term. 71 To alleviate the problems caused when a prisoner is
uncertain about his or her release date until soon before actual release, 72 the Commission amended its rules to provide that a "presumptive release date" be set in most cases following an initial
hearing held within 120 days of a prisoner's arrival at a federal in73
stitution.

The presumptive release date system, however, leaves several
problems unsolved. The sentencing judge does not determine the
length of time an offender spends in prison unless the judge actually imposes a sentence within or below the range suggested in the
guidelines. This generally ensures that the prisoner is released at

the expiration of his or her sentence less credit earned under the
good-time statutes, since the Parole Commission almost always sets
the presumptive release date at the date the sentence expires mication Manual, 4.19-.20 app. (U.S. Parole Comm'n Research Unit Rep. No. 16, 1977)
(adopted by the Commission as Appendix 4, U.S. Parole Comm'n Procedure Manual,
on May 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Guideline Application Manual]. Offenses of vagrancy, loitering, disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness, and violations of local
ordinances and traffic infractions, except serious offenses such as hit and run driving
or driving while intoxicated, are excluded from the category of prior convictions, Juvenile "status offenses" are also excluded. Id. at 4.19 app. Offenses are not counted
if the prisoner, before committing the offense for which he or she is imprisoned, had
spent 20 consecutive years in the community without committing a crime. Id. at 4.20
app. Similarly, a "substantial," unspecified period spent in the community without
committing an offense may place the prisoner in a better risk category; this gives
him or her a better salient factor score than would otherwise apply. Id.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a)-(b) (1976).
72. Under the Parole Commission rules in effect before 1978, the initial hearing was held at least 30 days before the expiration of the prisoner's minimum sentence or, if there were no minimum sentence, within 120 days of commencement of
sentence. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1976) (amended 1977). Thus, a defendant sentenced,
for example, to seven years of imprisonment and who was eligible for parole after
serving one-third of the term, see 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976), would not know for
more than two years when he or she might be released. If parole were denied following the initial hearing, 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1976) (amended 1977), the defendant
might not learn about release for another 18, or possibly 36, months-after one or two
additional hearings had taken place, 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(d)(1)-(2) (1976) (amended

1977). In the course of these hearings, the offender might not learn how the guidelines
were being applied. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(a), (c) (1976) (amended 1977).
73. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1978).
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nus good time. 74 However, this sentence is somewhat uncertain
because the prisoner cannot know what effect the operation of the
good-time statutes will have on his or her release date. 75
Uncertainty is increased if the sentence exceeds the parole
guidelines, permitting release either on parole or at the expiration
of sentence less good time. If the presumptive release date is other
than the date the sentence expires less good time, 76 and the prisoner violates a prison regulation, the prisoner faces a complex pattern of release-date uncertainties. The Bureau of Prisons determines a prisoner's release date under the good-time statutes 77 at
the same time that the Parole Commission sets the release date
under the parole statutes. 78 Release occurs on either the prisoner's
parole-release date 79 or the date the sentence expires, less goodtime credit earned toward service of sentence ° (for good behavior, 81 participation in work programs, 8 2 or meritorious service 83 ),

whichever is earlier. However, a violation of prison regulations can
affect the presumptive release date, whether or not this date is the
date of expiration of sentence less good time. Such a violation is
noted by the Bureau of Prisons in the prisoner's record. This may
induce the Parole Commission to change the presumptive release
74. A prisoner in such a case would only be released on parole if the Parole
Commission set a release date sufficiently below the guidelines to prevent the prisoner from earning enough good time to cause his or her mandatory release date to
precede the parole-release date. This is unlikely since the Commission only sets release dates below the guidelines in approximately 8% of the cases and not all these
cases involve relatively short sentences. S. Adelberg, supra note 63, at 13.
Most prisoners who are paroled rather than released at the expiration of sentence less good time are recipients of relatively long sentences. See B. StoneMeierhoefer, supra note 63, at R-9. Of the prisoners released in fiscal year 1975, the
average time served by persons released on parole was 27.8 months, or 37.8% of the
average sentence; the prisoners released at the expiration of sentence less good time
served an average of 12.6 months, or 67.8% of the average sentence. FEDERAL
PRISON SYSTEM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1975,

at 22 (1976). For a discussion of the good-time provisions, see notes text accompanying 77-85 infra; note 85 infra.
75. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
76. Unlike judicial sentencing, setting presumptive release dates is a nonpublic
procedure that masks from the public the actual time period a convicted defendant
spends in prison.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-4166 (1976).
78. Id. §§ 4201-4218.
79. Id. § 4206.
80. Id. § 4163.
81. Id. § 4161.

82. Id. § 4162.
83. Id.
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date, even if this date is based on the parole guidelines.8 4 The date
may be delayed to the date of expiration of sentence minus good
time. Moreover, the date of expiration of sentence minus good
time is uncertain, because forfeited good time may be restored.
Thus, the prisoner who violates a prison regulation, and whose
presumptive release date is below the date of expiration of sentence minus good time, could be released at any time between the
original presumptive release date and the date of expiration of sentence less good time.
Need for Legislative Reform
The United States Parole Commission's participation in the
sentencing process is too late to alleviate unwarranted sentencing
disparity and uncertainties about release dates. The Parole Commission can attempt to correct these difficulties only after they occur; even then the Commission's authority does not extend to all
cases. Comprehensive legislative reform is necessary to prevent
unwarranted disparity and uncertainty from the outset of the sentencing process.
SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF S.

1437

S. 1437,86 as passed by the Senate in the 95th Congress,

would prevent unwarranted disparity and uncertainty from the
start of the sentencing process, thus obviating the need for the
Parole Commission's attempts to correct these problems after their
inception. The bill would alleviate unwarranted disparity by providing for sentencing guidelines to structure judicial discretion in
selecting sentences and for appellate review of sentencing decisions. In addition, S. 1437 would increase the certainty of a prisoner's release date by generally establishing fully determinate sen84. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.14(a)(3)(iii), 2.34(a) (1978).
85. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4165-4166 (1976). Under Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement No. 7400.5D (July 7, 1975) (inmate discipline) [hereinafter
cited as Policy Statement No. 7400.5D], "[a]lI or part of an inmate's accumulated
good time may be forfeited." Id. at 13. Under Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement No. 7600.50C (Oct. 31, 1977) (extra good time) [hereinafter
cited as Policy Statement No. 7600.50C], accumulated good time other than good
time under 18 U.S.C. § 4161, i.e., good time under 18 US.C. § 4162, that has already
been earned cannot be forfeited. Id. at 3, 7. Only good time that has been earned for
good institutional behavior can be forfeited for misconduct. The Institution Discipline Committee must consider granting withheld good time within six months of
the conduct resulting in the withholding, and restoring forfeited good time within
one year of the misconduct. Policy Statement No. 7400.5D, supra, at 13.
86. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See note 1 supra.
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tences; release dates would be subject to adjustment only for
satisfactory compliance with institutional regulations.
Disparity
To ensure uniform and just sentencing, S. 1437 establishes
within the judicial branch a Sentencing Commission which would
promulgate guidelines to aid sentencing judges in determining appropriate sanctions. 8 7 The guidelines would recommend types of
sentences and, if a term of imprisonment were recommended, a
narrow durational range of imprisonment based on offender history
and characteristics and the offenses committed. 8 The Commission
would also be required to issue policy statements on sentencing
89
matters.
The bill specifies for the first time the factors a judge should
consider in imposing a sentence.90 The sentencing judge should
take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the offender. In addition, the
judge would be required to consider the four general purposes of
sentencing: To deter criminal conduct, to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the defendant, to ensure just punishment, and to provide needed correctional treatment for the defendant in the most effective manner. 9 ' The judge would also have
to consider all types of sentences that could be imposed9 2 and the
sentencing guidelines and policy statements promulgated by the
Sentencing Commission.93 The court could impose a sentence outside the guidelines only if it found that an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing
Commission would justify departure from the recommended
guidelines range. 94 The judge would be required to state reasons
for any sentence imposed; if the sentence differed from the applicable guidelines range, the judge would be required to explain thoroughly the deviation. 5
87. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 2003(a)(1)(D); Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, §§ 991(a), 994(a)(1). See M. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 118-23; P.
O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 9, at 51-53.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 994(a)(1), (b)(1).
Id. § 994(a)(2). See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1165 (1977).
Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 2003(a).
Id. § 2003(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 2003(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 2003(a)(1)(D), (E).
Id. § 2003(a)(2).
Id. § 2003(b). The purposes of requiring a statement of reasons for a sen-
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S. 1437 provides for appellate review of sentences outside the
guidelines range: 96 A defendant could appeal a sentence above the

guidelines recommendation;9 7 the government could appeal a sentence below the recommended range if the Attorney General or his

or her designee approved the appeal. 98 If the court of appeals determined that the sentence was unreasonable, it would be required
to state specific reasons for its findings, and either remand the case

for imposition of an appropriate sentence or for further sentencing
proceedings, 99 or resentence the defendant itself. To ensure con-

sistent interpretation of the guidelines, appellate review would be
available on petition' 0 0 for sentences imposed within the guide-

lines range if the defendant or the government alleged that the
guidelines had been incorrectly applied and the sentencing judge
disagreed.
Uncertainty

S. 1437 would ensure release-date certainty for most prisoners. The bill requires that, in most cases, the prison sentence actu-

ally served equal the sentence imposed less credit for satisfactory
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.' 0 1 The aver-

age prison term imposed must be similar to that now served,
rather than that now imposed.. 0 2 The judge would be permitted to
tence within the guidelines are: (1) To make clear to the defendant and the public
the purposes to be served by the sentence; (2) to provide guidance to probation or
prison officials in determining the appropriate type of prison or community based facility, if any, and program for the defendant; and (3) to address differences among
sentences specified in the guidelines for persons convicted of the same offense.
These differences reflect different purposes of sentences, such as probation to rehabilitate a first offender and incarceration to incapacitate or deter a second offender.
See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 8899, 8901-02 (statement of Pierce
O'Donnell, Michael J. Churgin & Dennis E. Curtis); M. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at
108-11.
96. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3725(a)-(b). Sentences that result from
plea agreements are exceptions to the right of appellate review of sentences outside
the guidelines range. Id.
97. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3725(a).
98. Id. § 3725(b).
99. Id. § 3725(e).
100. If the defendant or the government alleged that the guidelines had been
incorrectly applied, either could petition the United States Court of Appeals for
leave to appeal an order by the sentencing judge granting or denying a motion to
correct the sentence. Id. H 3723(b), 3724(d); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(t)
(1978) (proposed amendment to FED. R. CRiAm.
P. 35(b)(2)).
101. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3824(a)(1). See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
102. See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 2003(a)(2); Proposed 28 U.S.C.,
supra note 1, § 994(g), (1).
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make a prisoner eligible for release on parole only in an exceptional case where the guidelines specified that the sentence could
include eligibility for early release by the Parole Commission and
the judge found that "imprisonment appears to be the sole means
of achieving [a specific rehabilitation purpose]."103 To ensure that
the Parole Commission would implement a release policy consistent with sentencing decisions, 104 S. 1437 requires the Parole Commission to base its release determinations on guidelines promulgated for it by the Sentencing Commission.105
Although S. 1437 would substantially curtail indeterminate
sentences and parole release, it does not represent abandonment of
rehabilitation efforts.' 0 6 Rather, it recognizes that rehabilitation
should not be the principal reason for most prison terms, nor is it
an appropriate basis for determining prison-term length. Instead of
concentrating exclusively or primarily on rehabilitation, S. 1437
recognizes four purposes of sentencing: Just punishment; deterrence of criminal conduct by the offender and other, potential
offenders; incapacitation of the offender to protect the public; and
rehabilitation.10 7 The Sentencing Commission would be required
to consider these purposes in formulating sentencing guidelines for
federal offenses and general sentencing policy statements.' 0 8 S.
1437 does not place greater weight on any one purpose, nor does it
define the degree of potential overlap among the purposes. Rather,
it allows the Sentencing Commission to evaluate the extent to
which each sentencing purpose should and would be served by a
particular type and length of sentence for any given offense.10 9
103.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 9440). See also Proposed 28 U.S.C.,

supra note 1, § 994(b)(2); text accompanying note 8 supra.

104.

See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3831(c)(1).

105.

Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3831(c); Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra

note 1, § 994(e)(1).
106. See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 892 (1977); 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 8880, 8881 (statement of Norman A. Carlson, Director, Bureau
of Prisons); id. at 8595-96 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
107. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 101(b). See 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 3-4 (1970); H. PACKER,
THE LIMNTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANcTION 35-61 (1968).
108. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 991(b)(1)(A).
109. There are several directives to the Sentencing Commission and the
sentencing judge designed to provide general guidance regarding the purposes of
sentencing in particular types of cases. First, S. 1437, in effect, emphasizes
incapacitation and just punishment for certain offenders with extensive criminal records, or for offenders involved in criminal activity as a means of livelihood or as
part of a major conspiracy, by requiring that the sentencing guidelines provide that
most persons in these categories receive a "substantial term of imprisonment." Id. §
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The substantial narrowing of the parole-release function accomplished by S. 1437 is a recognition and affirmation of the minimal utility of parole release in a predominantly determinate
sentencing scheme. Guidelines would promote sentencing fairness,
virtual eradication of indeterminacy, and release-date certainty.
Thus, the primary purposes of the parole-release mechanism-to
alleviate unwarranted disparity among sentences and provide release-date certainty-would be better accomplished under S. 1437.
Although S. 1437 would severely diminish the parole-release
function, the bill would expand the role of the Parole Commission
in setting terms and conditions of postrelease supervision for every
prisoner whose term exceeds one year, even if it did not set the
release date. 110 The postrelease parole term would be separate
from the term of imprisonment; the authorized maximum parole
term would vary according to the grade of the offense."' The
Parole Commission would determine the length and conditions of
the parole term on the basis of parole guidelines and policy statements promulgated by the Sentencing Commission, characteristics
of the offense and offender, and the need to protect the public or
provide training, medical services, or other correctional treatment
112
to the parolee.
The question remains whether S. 1437 should be amended to
make all prison sentences fully determinate and to eliminate the
United States Parole Commission. S.1437 eliminates the need for
a parole system to alleviate unwarranted disparity in prison terms
or to provide more certainty in release dates for most prisoners.1 13
The Carter Administration supports the creation of a fully determinate sentencing system without a Parole Commission. 114 Conversely, the Parole Commission argues that S. 1437 unnecessarily
994(h). In addition, S.1437 cautions that a sentence to imprisonment is generally inappropriate in cases in which defendant "is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense." Id. § 994(i). S. 1437
further provides that "imprisonment is generally not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation." Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, §
101(b)(4). See Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 994(b)(2), 6).
110. See Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3841.
111. Id. § 3843(b).
112. Id. § 3843(a).
113. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
114. Statement of Ronald L. Gainer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning the
Sentencing Provisions of H.R. 6869 and S.1437, at 68 (Apr. 6, 1978) (on file in office
of the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Ronald L. Gainer].
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curtails its authority; the Commission advocates retaining its power
to determine "actual duration of confinement in the twenty-five
percent of all criminal sentences that involve imprisonment of
more than one year."1 1 5
If the Parole Commission is abolished, other sectors of the
federal criminal justice system must absorb traditional parole functions: providing assistance in maintaining institutional discipline,
encouraging participation in rehabilitation programs, preventing
further criminal activity by persons recently released from prison
to assist in their transition to the community. The next section explores dismantling the formal parole-release structure and distributing the Parole Commission's functions within the criminal justice system.
ABOLITION OF PAROLE IN A FULLY DETERMINATE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES SYSTEM
Abolition of the Parole-Release Mechanism
The responsibilities of the Parole Commission under S. 1437
are limited to setting release dates in cases where the sentencing
judge decides that a convicted defendant needs a rehabilitation
program which is available only in prison.'1 6 Because it is impossible to determine whether a particular defendant has been "rehabilitated, '" 7 the Department of Justice, in stating the Carter Administration recommendation," 8 argues that even prison sentences
for rehabilitative purposes should be determinate.1 9 This would
result in terms of imprisonment that are just "long enough for the
20
rehabilitation program to work if it is going to work at all."'
Terminating the Parole Commission's power to set release dates
would eliminate the remaining vestiges of indeterminate
sentencing from the federal criminal law. The prisoner, certain of
his or her release date from the outset of the sentence, could easily
determine the effect "good time" credit would have on the time he
or she actually will spend in prison.
The United States Parole Commission, conceding that
115. See Statement of Cecil C. McCall, supra note 10, at 29.
116. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 994(b)(2), 6). See notes 103-106 supra
and accompanying text.
117. See sources cited note 4 supra.
118. See Statement of Ronald L. Gainer, supra note 114.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 68.
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sentencing guidelines are desirable for "the structuring of judicial
discretion in making the critical choice between fine, probation, a
'split' sentence . . . , or incarceration,"' 21 envisions a role for itself
within a guidelines system. The Commission favors its own retention to determine, at the outset of the term, the actual length of
prison sentences that exceed one year. 122 It wishes to employ the
presumptive release date method it now uses, but with congres3
sional approval.12
The Commission's position is unjustified. The use of presumptive release dates is even more problematic under a guidelines
sentencing scheme than it is under current law. 124 Dividing
decisionmaking about types and lengths of sentences between
judges and the Parole Commission would make it difficult for the
system to fashion the most appropriate sentence for a particular defendant. Partitioning the sentencing decision between two
uncoordinated, independent authorities would promote inconsistency and unfairness. Differences in sentencing philosophies and
practices would inevitably occur if two bodies, one in the judicial
branch, the other in the executive branch, simultaneously promulgated and implemented sentencing guidelines. For example, the
Sentencing Commission might recommend incarceration for a particular combination of offense and offender characteristics, believing that a brief prison term would deter the defendant from future
criminal conduct; the Parole Commission, however, might assign a
substantially longer term, advocating imprisonment as just punishment.
In addition, segmenting the sentencing decision unfortunately
might result in freezing the thinking of policymakers in traditional,
less progressive, sentencing concepts. It is conceivable, for example, that a very heavy fine is a more severe penalty than a brief
prison term for a white-collar criminal who has made substantial financial gain as a result of his or her crime. Yet two sets of
guidelines-one for type of sentence, the other for length of prison
term-probably would preclude structuring guidelines to accommodate this kind of sentencing. Conversely, comprehensive
sentencing guidelines would present types and ranges of sentences
for particular offenses in a continuum which, when appropriate,
121. Statement of Cecil C. McCall, supra note 10, at 29.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 30.
124. For a discussion of current difficulties, see text accompanying notes 71-85.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss2/3

20

SENTENCING

FAIRNESS AND CERTAINTY IN
Skrivseth:
Abolishing Parole: Assuring Fairness and Certainty in Sentencing

19791

could avoid making imprisonment the harshest alternative.
It is also difficult to understand how appellate review of sentences would work under the Parole Commission proposal. It appears that the courts would review decisions regarding types of
sentences, while the Parole Commission would review decisions
regarding the appropriateness of the length of prison terms. It is
unclear whether a defendant sentenced both to imprisonment and
to pay a fine would be required to seek review of the prison term
from the Parole Commission and review of the fine from the
courts.
In further attacking the sentencing system in S. 1437, the
Parole Commission argues that sentencing judges in such a system
would continue to impose disparate sentences, 125 because of inconsistent guidelines interpretations 126 and because judges would con12 7
strue the guidelines "to suit their individual concepts of justice."
In the same statement, however, the Commission admits that it is
valuable for the sentencing judge to interpret the guidelines in
determining the type of sentence to impose. 12.

In addition, the

Commission ignores the fact that judges review the impact that the
parole guidelines will have on the sentences they impose; since
July 1, 1978, presentence reports have included information about
the applicable parole guidelines and the typical sentence for the offense. 129 Although this information is not as complex as sentencing
guidelines, it indicates that sentencing judges and probation officers who prepare presentence reports will have had several years'
experience interpreting parole guidelines before sentencing guidelines are in effect. 130 Furthermore, the Commission's unfortunate
conclusion that sentencing judges would interpret the guidelines
according to their personal sentencing philosophies, rather than apply the law neutrally and fairly, is insupportable. Appellate review
125.
126.
127.
128.

Statement of Cecil C. McCall, supra note 10, at 8-10.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 8, 29.

129. DIVISION OF PROBATION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 6, 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT].
130.

Parole guidelines have been in existence since 1973. See note 13 supra.

For a number of years, some judges have been examining the implications of the
Parole Commission's application of its guidelines to the sentences they impose.
Other judges have been aware of the effect of the guidelines on judicially imposed
sentences, since probation reports must include guidelines information. See
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 129.
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would be available for the unusual case in which the guidelines are
intentionally ignored or misapplied.
Absorption of Parole Functions by the System
If Congress abolishes the United States Parole Commission,
other facets of the federal criminal justice system will assure adequate institutional discipline, encourage rehabilitation, and provide
postrelease supervision and services.
Institutional Discipline.-Both the good-time allowance and
parole-release mechanisms in current law are designed to induce
institutional discipline by holding out the possibility of early release if prison regulations are obeyed. However, release-date
uncertainties caused by the complexity and interrelationship of the
two systems' 3 ' make improvement of institutional behavior much
less certain than under a simpler system.
Although good-time provisions may affect the behavior of prisoners who wish to remain eligible for parole, prison officials indicate that current good-time laws probably have little impact on the
behavior of prisoners who anticipate release on parole.1 32 The system for administering good-time statutes is so cumbersome that
credit is only withheld or forfeited 33 for the most serious disciplinary problems.' 34 Prison officials further assert that other means of
dealing with normal disciplinary problems, 135 such as denial of
privileges, effectively maintain discipline.' 36 Moreover, according
to prison officials, prisoners give little weight to the risk of forfeiting good time, because they assume it will be restored by the
131. See text accompanying notes 76-85 supra.
132. Statement of Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning the Sentencing Provisions of H.R. 6869 and S. 1437, at 7 (Apr. 10, 1978) (on

file in office of the Hofstra Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Norman
A. Carlson].
133. Any amount of statutory good time accumulated before a violation may be
forfeited, 18 U.S.C. § 4165 (1976); Policy Statement No. 7400.5D, supra note 85, at
13, since there is no vesting of good time except industrial or meritorious good time.
Policy Statement No. 7600.50C, supra note 85.
134. Policy Statement No. 7400.5D, supra note 85, at 8.
135. Disciplinary measures now used by the Bureau of Prisons include:
changing a prisoner's housing assignment or job; placing him or her in administrative detention or segregation; and, in extreme cases, assigning a prisoner to a more
secure facility or criminally prosecuting him or her for the offense committed while
in prison. See Policy Statement No. 7400.5D, supra note 85.
136. Statement of Norman A. Carlson. supra note 132, at 7.
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Institution Discipline Committee. 137 It is likely, however, that con-

ditioning presumptive release dates on continued good institutional
behavior may affect prisoners' attitudes about forfeiture of good
time.
Abolishing the Parole Commission and establishing a simplified version of the current good-time allowance is a preferable
alternative to the present incentive system for promoting institutional order. Although the effects of this approach on prison behavior cannot be predicted with certainty, prison officials believe that
disciplinary problems would not increase. 13 8 With the elimination
of parole in most cases, good time would become more important,
because it would be the sole mechanism for most prisoners to
reduce their time in prison. Allowing periodic vesting of credit
toward early release, rather than permitting forfeiture and subsequent restoration of earned credit, would create a continuing incentive for prisoners to earn good time through compliance with
institutional rules. The key advantage of periodic vesting is that it
would result in certainty that credit earned for good behavior
within a specified period is irrevocable. This would enable the prisoner to calculate his or her release date, fully aware of the kind of
behavior that will be rewarded with credit toward early release. A
system of periodic vesting would also be less cumbersome to administer than the current system; absent serious infractions, the
system could probably be administered as a routine bookkeeping
matter.
Participation in Rehabilitation Programs.-Although in the
past parole decisions were influenced by prisoner participation in
rehabilitation programs, this is rarely, if ever, the case under current practice. 139 It is difficult to ascertain, however, the extent to
which prisoners continue to believe that parole officials are influenced by such participation. 140 In most cases, a presumptive re137. See note 85 and accompanying text.
138. Statement of Norman A. Carlson, supra note 132, at 7.
139. The salient factor score for the application of the parole guidelines contains no rehabilitation factor. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978). The Guideline Application
Manual, supra note 70, at 4.17 app., provides that a prisoner may be paroled before
the applicable guideline date if he or she "has made a record of clearly exceptional
institutional program achievement over a substantial period of time." It goes on to
note that "[a] clear conduct record and a good program achievement is [sic] expected. This [reason for early parole] is reserved for cases in which the prisoner's record of program achievement is clearly exceptional, and should be supported by the
hearing summary." Id.
140. According to a student study, Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and
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lease date is set early in the term of imprisonment; 14 1 this date42 is
not advanced "except under clearly exceptional circumstances."1
In any event, participation in rehabilitation programs would
not be affected by abolition of parole. A growing concern that in-

voluntary participation in vocational training and rehabilitation programs is detrimental to rehabilitation 143 has led the Federal Bureau of Prisons to change its policies concerning requirements that

a prisoner participate in particular programs. Under current policy, 144 prisoners meet with prison officials to develop an appropri-

ate program of work and involvement in other activities. This policy stems from the belief that a prisoner will benefit more from a

program in which he or she participates voluntarily than from one
in which participation is mandated. 145

Recent experience of the Bureau of Prisons indicates that
substituting voluntary for involuntary participation in programs "is
not detrimental to prison rehabilitation in any way."' 146 There is

the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 829-30 (1975), prisoners have the impression that officials are influenced by participation in rehabilitation programs in part
because discussion in parole hearings emphasizes rehabilitation-oriented matters,
rather than the facts necessary to determine which guidelines apply to the prisoner.
A Bureau of Prisons survey of the heads of federal institutions indicates that, at least
in early 1977, 45% of the prison officials who responded to the survey believe that
inmates think the Parole Commission considers participation in programs, while 4%
believe the inmates think the Parole Commission does not consider participation in
programs. Memo of Roy E. Gerard, Assistant Director, Correctional Programs Division, to Executive Staff of Bureau of Prisons (Mar. 7, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Memo of Roy E. Gerard]. In fact, in recent years, it has been unusual for a prisoner
to be released early on the basis of an unusual level of rehabilitation. For example,
in the period from October 1973 through March 1974, the Parole Commission made
45 decisions below the guidelines in one region; 17 of the decisions were for "outstanding institutional progress," and 3 were because "clinical judgment indicate[d]
better risk than [was] indicated by salient factor score." P. Hoffman & L. DeGostin,
Parole Decision-Making: Structuring Discretion, at E-11 (U.S. Board of Parole Research Unit Rep. No. 5, 1976). Current Parole Commission rules state that, at the initial hearing, the hearing "examiners shall discuss with the prisoner his offense severity
rating and salient factor score as described in § 2.20, his institutional conduct and, in
addition, any other matter the panel may deem relevant." 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1978)
(discussing 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978)).
141. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (1978),
142. Id. § 2.14(a)(3)(ii).
143. Carlson, Corrections in the United States Today: A Balance Has Been
Struck, 13 AM. CKIM. L.R. 615, 627-35 (1976).
144. Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement No. 35000.2
(Mar. 7, 1978) (optional programming).
145. Address by Norman A. Carlson, 47th Annual Criminal Justice Institute of
Florida Council on Crime and Delinquency 4-5 (July 7, 1976).
146. Letter from Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, to
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a growing belief among corrections officials and researchers that

prisoners who know their release dates are motivated to participate
7
4
in programs that will benefit them. 1

Community Supervision.-Under current law, persons released on parole receive community supervision by probation offi-

cers until their sentences expire or they are released from parole

supervision.' 4 8 In addition, persons released after serving their

terms of imprisonment, less good-time deductions, are subject to
supervision for the remainder of their maximum terms, less 180

days. 149 This supervision is intended to serve two arguably conflict-

ing purposes: 150 protecting the community from additional crimes
by parolees and facilitating their return to the community by assisting them to obtain such things as employment and medical
services.

In contrast to the arbitrariness of current practices, parole supervision should be allocated more rationally-according to the

5
needs of the offender, the protection needed by the community, ' '

and the purposes of the prisoner's sentence. Under existing law,

parole supervision is provided and services, such as employment
and necessary medical assistance, are available regardless of need

if the offender is released either on parole or if, at the expiration of
the sentence less good time, the prisoner has earned at least 180
days of good-time deductions. 152 Conversely, no supervision or

services are provided to the prisoner who is released at the expiraHarry A. Scarr, Assistant Director, Office of Policy and Planning, United States Department of Justice (Oct. 5, 1976). In a memorandum outlining the results of a survey
of officials, Roy Gerard, Assistant Director of the Correctional Programs Division of
the Bureau of Prisons, indicated that 62% of the Bureau of Prisons officials who responded to the questionnnaire found that making rehabilitation programs in their institutions voluntary did not significantly change inmate participation, 24% found that
making the programs voluntary increased enrollment, and 10% found that enrollment
decreased. Memo of Roy E. Gerard, supra note 140.
147. 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 14, at 9079, 9082-83 (testimony of Nancy
Crisman, ACLU national prison project). This position was also adopted by Lawrence
Bennet, Director of Research, California State Department of Corrections, and Owen
Kennedy, Gerard M. Farkas, and James D. Henderson, regional directors of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, in telephone interviews with Stephen Finan, Office of Policy
and Planning, United States Department of Justice (1976).
148. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4210-4211 (1976).
149. Id. § 4164.
150. See D. STANLEY, PRiSONERs AMONG US 102-03 (1976).
151. See generally Martinson & Wilks, Save Parole Supervision, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1977, at 23, reprinted in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 14, at 9257.
152.
18 U.S.C. §§ 4164, 4210 (1976).
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tion of the sentence if the prisoner has earned less than 180 days of
good-time deductions, 153 regardless of the purpose of the sentence
and the prisoner's need for supervision or services to assist his or
her transition back into the community.
Although S. 1437 strictly limits the power of the Parole Commission to set release dates, it expands the Commission's role in
setting terms and conditions of postrelease supervision. Unlike current law, S. 1437 would subject each prisoner sentenced to more
than one year's imprisonment to postrelease supervision, 154 regardless of whether the prisoner serves the full sentence, 155 or is released early either by the Parole Commission 56 or because of
credit earned for satisfactory compliance with institutional discipline rules. 157 The Senate bill further requires that the Bureau of
Prisons provide, to the extent possible, that a prisoner spend the
last six months of a sentence that exceeds one year or the last
thirty days of a shorter sentence "under conditions that will afford
the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for
his re-entry into the community."' 158 During this period, the probation system would, where practical, provide services to the pris59
oner.1
Essentially, S. 1437 would assure that postrelease supervision
is given to any person with a sentence exceeding one year who
needs it. Unfortunately, the bill would accomplish this by retaining
the Parole Commission to set terms and conditions of release even
in cases where postrelease supervision is not necessary. The result
would be both expensive and cumbersome.
A better approach to determining the need for and conditions
of postrelease supervision is to transfer this decision from the
Parole Commission to the sentencing judge. By considering the
purposes of sentencing in the particular case, the offense, the characteristics of the offender, and the recommendations in the sentencing guidelines and policy statements, the judge could decide
whether a period of postrelease supervision is advisable. 160 Such
supervision would probably be inappropriate when the primary
153. 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1976).
154. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1,
155. Id. §§ 3824(a)(1)-(2), 3841.

§ 3841.

156. Id. § 3824(a)(1)(b).
157. Id. § 3824(a)(2).
158. Id. § 3824(c). See S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1081-82 (1977).
159. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1,

§

3824(c); S. REP. No. 605, 95th Cong.,

1st Sess. 1081-82 (1977).
160. See Statement of Ronald L. Gainer, supra note 114, at 70-71.
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purpose of the sentence is just punishment or general deterence; it
might be appropriate when the primary sentencing purpose is incapacitation or rehabilitation.1

6

1

Services should be provided by the probation system if a
former prisoner requests them during the first few months after release, regardless of whether the prisoner is subject to postrelease
supervision.' 62 Thus, for example, a former prisoner could request
and receive assistance in securing a job or necessary medical services, such as community drug-treatment programs, from the probation system.
Effect of Abolishing the Parole Commission on the
Federal CriminalJustice System
In addition to abolishing the Parole Commission, the creation
of a fully determinate sentencing system will substantially affect the
Bureau of Prisons, the probation system, and the federal courts.
United States Parole Commission.-While this proposal would
strip the Parole Commission of jurisdiction over persons sentenced
after the effective date of a determinate sentencing code, it will be
necessary to phase out the Commission gradually to enable it to
continue to deal with persons sentenced before this date.' 6 3 Since
the average prisoner released on parole in a recent year served
26.9 months in prison,' 64 it appears that the Commission must retain all of its employees for at least the first two years after the effective date of a sentencing guidelines system abolishing parole.
Even after the Commission is fully abolished, most parole special161. Id. at 71. This testimony suggests that postrelease supervision could be for
a period of six months or one year, rather than the longer periods provided for in S.
1437, see Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 3843(b). 162. Statement of Ronald L. Gainer, supra note 114, at 70.
163.

A possible alternative to gradually phasing out the Commission is to abol-

ish the Commission on the effective date of the determinate sentencing code and require that a designated authority determine each prisoner's probable release date under the latest parole guidelines, as well as the sentence the prisoner would have
received pursuant to the new sentencing guidelines. The prisoner would be released
on the earlier of the two dates. When the California legislature recently enacted a

determinate sentencing statute, it required the Community Release Board to determine what each prisoner's sentence would be under the new provisions; however, if

the newer sentence would be shorter than the time that the prisoner would have
served under the indeterminate sentencing law, and specified aggravating circumstances were present, the parole date could be set at a later date. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
164. Federal Prison System, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statistical Report, Fiscal

Year 1976 (forthcoming).
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ists should have little difficulty finding employment in federal or
state corrections systems, state parole boards, or other fields related to criminal justice. In fact, some parole employees have
knowledge and experience needed by the Sentencing Commission
in developing its guidelines and policy statements.
The United States Parole Commission is an extremely costly
and complex mechanism for setting release dates for federal prisoners. 16 5 This is especially true because many of the Commission
hearings and review proceedings are probably unnecessary. Hearings are held even when there is no realistic prospect that they will
result in changing a presumptive release date, 166 or when the record clearly indicates that the parole guidelines release date or the
date of expiration of sentence is the presumptive release date. Further, abolishing parole would obviate the need for complicated and
repetitive review procedures. Under current law, the first stage of
review of the parole examiner's decision is conducted by the regional commissioner. 1 6 7 If the regional commissioner wishes to reverse the decision of the hearing examiners or alter the release
date by more than 180 days, other regional commissioners must review the record. 16 8 There is a final appeal to the National Appeals
Board.169
Sentencing guidelines and policy statements will have to be
carefully drawn to avoid uiintended changes in sentencing practice. For example, factors justifying a release-date decision outside
the parole guidelines must be appropriately dealt with in the
sentencing guidelines. These factors include: aggravating or mitigating offense factors, credit for past or future service in state custody
for other offenses, judgments indicating a higher or lower risk of
repeated criminal behavior than suggested by the factors taken into
consideration in the guidelines, and health or mental capacity
problems that justify a lighter or heavier sentence than might ordi170
narily be given.
165. According to the Parole Commission, it spent approximately $3,390,000
in fiscal year 1976 to produce 27,471 parole decisions of all types at a cost of approximately $123.44 per decision. Memo from Jim Fife, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Parole Commission, to Stephen Finan, Office of Policy and Planning
(Sept. 17, 1976) (on file in office of the Hofstra Law Review).
166. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.14(a)(3) (1978).
167. 28 C.F.R. § 2.25(a) (1978).
168. Id. § 2.25(b).
169. Id. § 2.26 (1978).
170. Many of these cases are based on a rehabilitation theory of sentencing that
probably would not be used as the basis of determining the length of sentence under
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Bureau of Prisons.-It is unlikely that a determinate
sentencing system will have any appreciable effect on the size of
the federal prison population and, therefore, on the budget of the
Bureau of Prisons. In establishing sentencing guidelines, the
Sentencing Commission will make judgments about the appropriateness of incarceration for each type of offense and offender. The
process of determining which categories of offenders should be imprisoned will result in establishing priorities for use of prison facilities. These priorities may cause some changes in the makeup of the
prison population, such as more repeat offenders and fewer firstoffense car thieves. The bill should not, however, substantially alter the current average term of imprisonment or the size of the
prison population: The Sentencing Commission is required to consider the capacity of the federal prison system when creating the

guidelines. 171
The simplified procedure that would result from using credit toward early release, rather than the parole system, to determine release dates should be less costly for the Bureau of Prisons to administer than the existing good-time allowance procedure.172
Under a system that periodically vests credit for good behavior and
denies credit for bad behavior during the same short period,
recordkeeping would be less time consuming than under the more
complex forfeiture provisions of current law. These provisions permit forfeiture of any statutory good time accumulated up to the
time of a violation of institutional rules. 173 In addition, since the
simplified procedure would preclude restoration of credit withheld
or forfeited as a result of a prisoner's noncompliance with institutional regulations during a specified period, the cost of periodically

the determinate sentencing proposals. See Guideline Application Manual, supra note
70, at 4.13-.17 app.
171. See Proposed 28 U.S.C., sitpra note 1, § 994(g). Discussing his earlier
sentencing guidelines bill, S.2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), Senator Edward M.
Kennedy stated:
It is likely that the guidelines would mandate sentences substantially less
than the maximums now authorized by law. But in terms of actual time
served I do not see a radical change. Nor do I perceive the possibility of the
guidelines approach increasing prison populations. I suspect that sentences
of imprisonment would be reserved for the more serious crimes, with petty
offenders-too often the cause of overcrowded prisons-avoiding lengthy
prison terms.
Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JuD. 208, 214 (1976).
172. For current good-time allowance rules, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161-4166 (1976).
173. Id. § 4165.
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reviewing the appropriateness of restoration of credit would be
eliminated. Further, the provisions toward credit for early release
would directly affect the prison terms of all prisoners to whom they
apply, rather than only the terms of those released at the expiration of sentence less good-time and those whose presumptive release dates are adjusted because of poor institutional behavior.
United States Probation System.-Although the United States
Parole Commission determines when to release a prisoner on
parole, 174 probation officers supervise the parolees. 17 5 If the Parole
Commission were abolished and postrelease supervision were made
part of the sentence in appropriate cases, the nature of the persons
supervised, rather than their number, would probably change. The
decision whether to place an offender on postrelease supervision
should be based on the purposes of the sentence, not on the often
arbitrary selection of the statute under which the offender is sentenced. Furthermore, the determination of the length of the supervision period should not be affected by the term of imprisonment,
nor does the maximum supervision period need to be as long as it
often is under current law.
In addition, it would be necessary for the probation system to
provide services for releasees not placed on postrelease supervision, for a brief period immediately following their release. To do
so, the probation system would work closely with halfway houses
and other community-based treatment centers. 176 The cost of this
would depend on the ability of the probation system to develop
programs the prisoners view as helpful. To prepare for release,
many prisoners would probably seek the services providedparticularly assistance in obtaining employment-while still in custody. Once released, however, there might be less incentive for
former prisoners to request services from the probation system, because the programs would be entirely voluntary and offenders
would no longer be under any form of supervision.
174.

Id. §§ 4203(b), 4206.

175. Id. §§ 3655, 4203(b)(4); 28 C.F.R. § 2.38(a) (1978).
176. Under current law, a parolee or mandatory releasee may be required, as a
condition of release, to reside in or participate in a program of a residential community

treatment center. 18 U.S.C. § 4209(c)(1) (1976). Thus, the probation system currently
works with the Bureau of Prisons in the community treatment centers to carry out its
responsibility of supervising releasees. Id. §§ 3655, 4203(b)(4); 28 C.F.R. § 2.38(a)
(1978).
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Federal Court System.-The creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission is the only aspect of the determinate
sentencing proposal that would have a measurable impact on the
resources of the federal courts. However, other aspects of the
sentencing proposal would affect sentencing proceedings and issues
before the appellate courts.
The major cost of reform to the federal court system would
probably be expenditures for the United States Sentencing Commission. Under S. 1437, compensation for the seven-member Commission would be equivalent to that for judges of the United States
Courts of Appeals. 17 7 The Commission would have a full-time staff
of experts in fields related to corrections and a GS-18 staff director. 178 It would also have power, in connection with its duty to
promulgate sentencing guidelines and policy statements, to con79
duct a research program.1
It is unlikely that the cost to the federal court system of the
sentencing process for an individual case will be appreciably different under the proposal than under current law. Rule 32(a)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the defendant
be permitted to make a statement in his or her own behalf, and
that defense counsel and the attorney for the government also be
permitted to speak to the court.'8 0 The only change in the
sentencing hearing effected by a sentencing guidelines system
would be that the judge must announce how the guidelines apply
to the convicted defendant and permit the defense and prosecution
to comment on the classification. This change should not necessitate more time for the hearing; rather, it should focus the hearing
on the characteristics of the offense and the offender, considerations which are most important to the determination of an appropriate sentence.
Determinate guidelines sentences undoubtedly would affect
defendants' decisions whether to plead guilty. If, for example, a
defendant were charged under current law with an offense carrying
a potential maximum prison term of ten years, the defendant might
177.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 992(c).

178.

Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 995(a)(2); see 1977 Senate Hearings,

supra note 14, at 9005 (statement of Ronald L. Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Improvements in the Administration of Criminal Justice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice).
179. Proposed 28 U.S.C., supra note 1, § 995(a)(12).
180. FED. R. CpifM. P. 32(a)(1).
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be reluctant to plead guilty to the charge even if he or she knows
that the average time served in prison by persons convicted of the
same offense is substantially shorter than ten years. Under a
sentencing guidelines system, however, the offender knows the
recommended sentence for a person with the same offense/offender
characteristics and criminal history. If the defendant knows that the
evidence against him or her is strong and believes that the recommended sentence is reasonable, the defendant might be more inclined to plead guilty than under current law. Conversely, if the
defendant believes that the evidence is not strong, or that the sentence recommended in the guidelines is too high, he or she might
be more inclined to go to trial and require the government to
prove its case.
It is difficult to estimate the cost of permitting appellate review of sentences outside the sentencing guidelines, since the
number of cases that will be appealed is unknown.'"' It is unlikely
that all sentences outside the guidelines will result in petitions for
appellate review. The requirement of Attorney General approval of
appeals by the government should minimize the number of appeals
of sentences below the guidelines. Such appeals probably will be
limited by Department of Justice policy to cases in which the sentence is substantially lower than the circumstances warrant or
where the judge's stated reasons for setting a sentence below the
recommended guidelines range could establish undesirable precedent. Moreover, a sentence may not vary sufficiently from the
guidelines to warrant an appeal, particularly if the sentencing judge
articulates justifiable reasons for the sentence. Although the initial
level of appeals may be relatively high, it will probably diminish
considerably as a body of case law develops concerning the appropriateness of particular reasons for sentences outside the guidelines.' 82 Connecticut and Massachusetts, which have provisions for
appellate review of sentences, have found that appeal of a sentence
that follows a conviction after a trial is more likely than appeal of a
181. For a description of the appellate procedure under S. 1437, see notes
96-100 supra and accompanying text.
182. It has even been suggested that the availability of appellate review of sentences might reduce the burden on the courts of appeals. Some commentators believe that many groundless appeals and petitions for habeas corpus now filed probably would not be brought if the convicted defendant had a mechanism

for

challenging his or her sentence. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 4, at 81-82;
Richey, Appellate Review of Sentencing: Recommendation for a Hybrid Approach, 7
HOFST,A L. REv. 71, 77 (1978).
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sentence that follows a guilty plea, and that most appeals occur
when the sentence exceeds three years in Connecticut and five
years in Massachusetts. 18 3
There may also be motions to correct sentence that claim inaccurate categorization of the offense or offender resulted in inappropriate application of the guidelines. Such motions, however,
will probably not be burdensome. In most cases, the prosecution
and defense will not disagree about the application of the offense
and offender charactertistics specified in the guidelines; if such disagreement does occur, it is likely to be focused on a narrow issue.
Furthermore, review of judges' decisions on such motions would
be only by petition for leave to appeal. 18 4 This would enable appellate courts to limit review of guidelines-application cases to those
which the courts believe present problems.
CONCLUSION

The fairness and effectiveness of the federal sentencing process
will be enhanced if S. 1437 is enacted. S. 1437 shifts the focus of
federal sentencing law away from the outmoded theory of rehabilitation, thereby permitting a more balanced approach to sentencing
-the end-product of the criminal justice system. In addition, enactment of S. 1437 would result in providing guidance to judges, enabling them to implement their sentencing responsibilities more
fairly. This would serve to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentences imposed. S. 1437 would also introduce a logical division of
related functions: The sentencing judge, rather than the Parole
Commission, would determine the appropriate effects of offense
and offender characteristics (known at the time of sentencing) on
a prisoner's release date; the Parole Commission would determine
the effect that subsequent events should have on the release date in
those unusual cases in which progress in a correctional program is
relevant to the release date. Finally, S. 1437 would permit continual refinement of federal sentencing policy and practices by providing for evaluation of the effectiveness of the sentencing guidelines
and for appellate opinions regarding sentences outside the guidelines.
183. Zeisel & Diamond, Search for Sentencing Equity: Sentence Review in
Massachusetts and Connecticut, 1977 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 881, 902-06.
In Massachusetts 7% of the sentences following guilty pleas were appealed, while
26% of the sentences following conviction at trial were appealed; in Connecticut
16% of the sentences following guilty pleas were appealed, while 50% of the sentences following convictions at trial were appealed. Id.
184. Proposed 18 U.S.C., supra note 1, §§ 3723(b), 3724(d).
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Amending S. 1437 to abolish parole would eliminate the last
vestiges of indeterminate sentencing. This would enable both prisoners and the public to know that an announced prison sentence
actually represents the length of time a prisoner will spend in
prison. 185 Abolishing parole also would eliminate the current costly
duplication of effort that occurs because both the sentencing judge
and the Parole Commission evaluate information available at the
time of sentencing, often with inconsistent results. The Parole
Commission has been attempting to reduce unwarranted disparity
in prison sentences for a number of years, but application of
sentencing guidelines in a single proceeding at the beginning of
the sentencing process will avoid unwarranted disparity in all aspects of the sentencing decision.
Abolition of parole would not have a deleterious effect on
prison discipline or participation in institutional educational and vocational programs; in fact, it would have a favorable effect because
of the increased certainty of the release date-an incentive to plan
for the future. Furthermore, limiting parole supervision to those
cases where the purposes of sentencing suggest the desirability of
postrelease supervision would have little, if any, effect on the recidivism rate of released prisoners; it would, on the other hand, enable probation officers to concentrate their postrelease-supervision
efforts on those releasees who most need supervision and on providing services to all other releasees in a noncoercive context.
185. The sentence imposed, however, would be subject to a small reduction for
good behavior in prison.
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